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E-Discovery: Why and How E-mail Is Changing the
Way Trials Are Won and Lost
I. INTRODUCTION
Since their inception, the discovery provisions of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure' ("Rules") have treated electronically
stored information the same as other traditionally discoverable
documents, making no distinctions between files found on a hard
drive and those found in a filing cabinet. 2 However, as electronic
documents are inherently different from tangible documents, both
judges and litigants alike have been struggling to apply the dis-
covery rules to the production of electronic documents. The pro-
duction of electronic documents throughout the discovery phase of
litigation is known as "e-discovery," and has been an ongoing
thorn in the side of the federal judiciary for years.
To solve this problem, the Civil Rules Advisory Committee
("Committee") drafted a series of amendments ("Amendments")
designed to address the differences between e-discovery and tradi-
tional discovery. 3 The Amendments have since been approved by
1. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were promulgated under Title 28 of the
United States Code. See generally 28 U.S.C., FED. R. CIv. P. (2006). The discovery provi-
sions of the Rules are found within Rules 26 through 53 and cover all procedural aspects of
discovery commenced within the federal courts of the United States. 28 U.S.C.A., Rules,
Explanation (2006).
2. The Rules were first promulgated in 1938 and did not include practices and proce-
dures for dealing with the disclosure of electronic data during the discovery phase of trial
until 2000. CIV. R. ADV. COMM., 109TH CONG., REPORT OF THE CIVIL RULES ADVISORY
COMMITTEE C-1 (2005) [hereinafter REPORT]. Even then, the Rules regarding e-discovery
were fully understood by the Committee to be "incomplete." REPORT, at C-20.
3. Id. at C-1. The Committee began examining whether the discovery rules could
better accommodate the disclosure of electronic data in 2000. Id. at C-18. The study con-
sisted of several mini-conferences and one major conference, in which expert opinions from
numerous lawyers, academics, judges and litigants were elicited. Id. In August of 2004,
the Committee published a draft of the proposed Amendments for comment. Id. Three
hearings were held in 2005 in which experts were given an opportunity to comment on the
proposed Amendments. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-1. Afterwards, the Amendments were
again revised and sent to the Standing Committee for approval. Id. at C-18. Upon ap-
proval of the Standing Committee, the Amendments were sent to the Judicial Conference
Committee for codification. ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE, SEPTEMBER 2005 SUMMARY OF THE REPORT OF THE JUDICIAL CONFERENCE
COMMITTEE ON RULES OF PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 21 (2005), available at
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/Reports/ST09-2005.pdf [hereinafter SUMMARY].
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both Congress 4 and the United States Supreme Court,5 and went
into effect on December 1, 2006.6 Because the Amendments make
significant modifications to the Rules, attorneys must be aware;
not only will such cognizance allow them to take advantage of the
strategic benefits that the Amendments may bestow, it will also
allow them to conform with the new procedures in order to avoid
the imposition of significant monetary sanctions upon their cli-
ents. 7
II. PROBLEM: ELECTRONIC DOCUMENTATION IS INHERENTLY
DIFFERENT FROM PAPER DOCUMENTATION
In 2001, the Committee began to realize that the Rules regard-
ing discovery needed to be reworked, as the differences between
electronic documentation and standard paper documentation were
causing major problems to parties involved in litigation.8 Parties
were spending hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of dollars to
comply with Rules written before electronic data even existed. 9
4. SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 21-38. The Judicial Conference Committee approved
the Amendments in September of 2005. Id.
5. On April 12, 2006, the United States Supreme Court adopted the Committee's
proposed Amendments. 2006 U.S. ORDER (C.O. 20).
6. "[The foregoing Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure... shall take
effect on December 1, 2006, and shall govern in all proceedings thereafter commenced and,
insofar as just and practicable, all proceedings then pending." Id.
7. It is important for all legal professionals to have a thorough understanding of the
Amendments. As Robert Medved, former clerk for the Honorable Jesse W. Curtis, United
States District Court for the Central District of California, stated:
If you are assuming that you need not be concerned with the discovery of elec-
tronically stored information or the E-Discovery Rule Amendments since you
do not litigate in federal court, or do not represent large clients, or do not rep-
resent high-tech clients, or do not litigate big cases, or do not practice intellec-
tual property law, you may want to rethink that assumption.
Robert A. Medved, E-Discovery and the Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: A Primer (June 2006), available at
http://wsba.org/media/publications/barnews/une06-medved.htm. Further, discovery repre-
sents 50 percent of litigation costs in the average case and up to 90 percent of litigation
costs in cases where discovery is actively pursued. Judicial Conference Adopts Rule
Changes, Confronts Projected Budget Shortfalls, THE THIRD BRANCH, (Admin. Office of the
U.S. Courts), Oct. 1, 1999, http://www.uscourts.gov/ttb/oct99ttb/october1999.html.
8. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-18. "FIhe Committee has reached consensus on two
points. First, electronically stored information has important differences from information
recorded on paper.... Second, these differences are causing problems in discovery that rule
amendments can hopefully address." Id.
9. 2006 U.S. ORDER, supra note 5. "Using an example from current technology, many
large organizations routinely recycle hundreds of backup tapes every two or three weeks;
placing a hold on the recycling of these tapes for even short periods can result in hundreds
of thousands of dollars of expense." Id. See generally Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 217
F.R.D. 309 (2003) ("Zubulake "). It was estimated that it would cost defendant, UBS War-
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The cost of e-discovery was getting out of hand, and the Commit-
tee was afraid that parties were settling lawsuits, not based on the
merits of the case, but rather to avoid the high costs relative to
electronic data disclosure. 10
After five years of research, the Committee found that there
were three basic aspects of e-discovery that were most problem-
atic: the voluminous nature in which electronic data is stored, the
way it is preserved and the form in which it is produced. 1 A thor-
ough understanding of these issues is necessary before one can
gain insight on the Amendments themselves.
A. The Storage of Electronic Data
Perhaps the biggest difference between electronic documenta-
tion and paper documentation is the fact that electronic data can
be stored in a much greater volume than hard-copy data. In fact,
the sheer volume of electronic data, when compared with conven-
tional paper documentation, can be staggering. Each gigabyte 12
averages approximately 500 thousand typewritten pages; there-
fore, a typical hard drive with a storage capacity of 100 gigabytes
can store up to five million pages of plain text documentation.
13
When one applies this statistic to a large office with 100 com-
puters, a discovery request for "all relevant documents" suddenly
requires the responding party to comb through 500 million pages
burg, LLC, approximately $300,000 to comply with the court's discovery order by producing
electronic data contained on "backup tapes." Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 313.
10. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-19. "When the Committee deliberated on the liberal
discovery rules.., they raised the concern that expanded discovery would force settlements
for reasons and on terms that related more to the costs of discovery than to the merits of
the case, a concern raised frequently in the context of electronic discovery." Id.
11. Id. at C-18. The three most problem-causing distinctions between traditional dis-
covery and electronic discovery are "that electronically stored information is retained in
exponentially greater volume than hard-copy documents; electronically stored information
is dynamic, rather than static; and electronically stored information may be incomprehen-
sible when separated from the system that created it." Id.
12. A "byte" is a unit of memory on a computer, typically used to represent letters and
numbers. MERRIAM WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 157 (10th ed. 1988). A "gigabyte"
is 1,073,741,824 bytes of memory. Id. at 491.
13. Applied Discovery, E-Discovery in Depth - Tech Tips,
http://www.lexisnexis.com/applieddiscovery/clientResources/techTipsl.asp (last visited Apr.
5, 2007). This figure is a rough estimate based on the fact that while a gigabyte can house
approximately 677,963 pages of plain text documentation, files such as Microsoft Word
documents require a greater storage capacity. Id. A gigabyte can only house 64,782 pages
of documentation saved in Microsoft Word. Id. See also M. OVERLY & C. HOWELL,
DOCUMENT RETENTION IN THE ELECTRONIC WORKPLACE 2-3 (Pike & Fischer 2001).
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of text. 14 This is just the tip of the iceberg, however, as most large
businesses also store data on backup disks.
Backup disks are popular because while they are small enough
to fit in a briefcase, each one can hold up to 500 billion pages of
plain text. 15 Compare this to paper document storage, which
would require a large warehouse to store 500 billion pieces of pa-
per. While convenient for storage purposes, however, backup
disks pose a huge disadvantage to litigants as they are not de-
signed to allow for the organized retrieval of data. Instead,
backup disks must be restored onto a hard drive and re-formatted
before they can be searched. 16
This is where voluminous storage becomes problematic. Rule
26(b)(1), 17 for example, requires parties to disclose all relevant
information likely "to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence"
during the discovery phase of trial; yet it can be extremely costly
and time consuming to sift through a backup disk containing 500
billion pages of text to find relevant data.' 8 Producing electronic
data from a backup tape typically takes five days and can cost
hundreds of thousands of dollars.19
14. 2006 U.S. ORDER, supra note 5. "Commonly cited current examples of such volume
include the capacity of large organizations' computer networks to store information in tera-
bytes, each of which represents the equivalent of 500 million typewritten pages of plain
text, and to receive 250 to 300 million e-mail messages monthly." Id.
15. FEDERAL JUDICIARY CENTER, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (FOURTH) § 11.446
(2004).
16. Zubulake I, LLC, 217 F.R.D. 309, 314 (2003). "Because each [backup] tape repre-
sents a snapshot of one server's hard drive in a given month, each server/month must be
restored separately onto a hard drive." Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 314.
17. Pre-Amendment Rule 26(b)(1) stated:
Parties may obtain discovery regarding any matter, not privileged, that is rele-
vant to the claim or defense of any party, including the existence, description,
nature, custody, condition, and location of any books, documents, or other tan-
gible things and the identity and location of persons having knowledge of any
discoverable matter. For good cause, the court may order discovery of any mat-
ter relevant to the subject matter involved in the action. Relevant information
need not be admissible at trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated to
lead to the discovery of admissible evidence. All discovery is subject to the
limitations imposed by Rule 26(b)(2)(i), (ii), and (iii).
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1) (2005) (emphasis added).
18. See supra note 9. See also Detweiler Bros., Inc. v. John Graham & Co., 412 F.
Supp. 416, 422 (D. Wash. 1976) ("A request for discovery should be considered relevant if
there is any possibility that information sought may be relevant to the subject matter of the
action"); Miller v. Doctor's Gen. Hosp., 76 F.R.D. 136, 138-39 (D. Okla. 1977) ("Discovery
should ordinarily be allowed under the concept of relevancy unless it is clear that the in-
formation sought can have no possible bearing upon the subject matter of the action....").
19. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 313-14. While complicated, backup tape restoration can
be broken down into a four-step procedure. Id. First, the relevant backup tape must be
located. Id. Software is then used to transfer the data from the backup tape onto a hard
drive. Id. A separate software program is used to extract the restored files and convert
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To further aggravate the process, the restoration of volumi-
nously stored data poses a substantial risk of the inadvertent
waiver of both the attorney-client and work-product privileges.
20
After responsive data is gathered from backup tapes, the respond-
ing party must hire attorneys to review the files for privileged ma-
terials. While it is very expensive and time consuming to review
hundreds of thousands of files in order to locate and review privi-
leged data, such is necessary, as even the inadvertent disclosure of
privileged documents may result in a waiver of the right to later
assert any privileges.
21
The leading authority for determining the duties and obliga-
tions of parties involved with electronic data storage and produc-
tion is Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC. 22 While Zubulake I in-
volved a simple employment discrimination claim, much of the
case centered on a single discovery dispute. 23 Prior to trial, plain-
tiff Laura Zubulake served a discovery request upon defendant
UBS Warburg, LLC ("UBS") which called for the production of
every e-mail sent and received from the accounts of five UBS em-
ployees during a two-year span. 24 UBS refused to produce the e-
mails, arguing that the request was unduly costly and burden-
them into a usable, native format. Id. The user is then able to use "keyword" searches to
find any responsive data. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 313-14. In Zubulake I, experts esti-
mated that it would cost the defendant $300,000 to restore electronic data from 94 separate
backup tapes. Id. at 313.
20. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-54. As the Committee stated:
The volume of electronically stored information responsive to discovery and the
varying ways such information is stored and displayed make it more difficult to
review for privilege than paper. The production of privileged material is a sub-
stantial risk and the costs and delay caused by privilege review are increas-
ingly problematic.
Id.
21. Transam. Computer Co. v. Int'l. Bus. Mach., Inc., 573 F.2d 646, 651 (9th Cir. 1978)
("a disclosure of confidential material constitutes a waiver of the attorney-client privilege
only if it is voluntary and not compelled").
22. There were six decisions rendered by the United States District Court for the
Southern District of New York in regards to Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC. See Zubulake
1, 217 F.R.D. at 309 (addressing "cost-shifting"); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 230
F.R.D. 290 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Zubulake II') (addressing the release of confidential deposition
transcripts); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 216 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Zubulake
IIF') (allocating backup tape restoration costs); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 220 F.R.D.
212 (S.D.N.Y. 2003) ("Zubulake IV") (addressing the preservation of evidence, spoliation
and sanctions); Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 229 F.R.D. 422 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) ("Zubulake
V") (granting sanctions and imposing an adverse inference instruction against UBS); and
Zubulake v. UBS Warburg, LLC, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) ("Zubulake VI") (rul-
ing on the parties' motions in limine).
23. Zubulake 1, 217 F.R.D. at 311-13.
24. Id. at 317.
273
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some under Rule 26(b)(1)(iii). 25 Zubulake subsequently moved to
compel production of the e-mails, and a discovery hearing date
was set. 26 At the hearing, UBS supported its position by claiming
that the requested e-mails were scattered throughout 94 separate
backup disks and experts estimated it would cost approximately
$300,000 to restore, review and produce all relevant e-mails.
27
Turning to the plain language of Rule 26(b)(1), the court found,
as a general rule, that a responding party has a duty to disclose all
information likely to lead to the discovery of relevant evidence,
regardless of cost. 28 However, under Rule 26(b)(1)(iii), 29 the court
has discretion to limit discovery that is "unduly burdensome or
expensive."
30
In ruling on Zubulake's motion to compel, the court first decided
that only data stored in an "inaccessible" format will cause produc-
ing parties an undue burden or expense. 31 Data is inaccessible if
it is "not readily usable and reasonably indexed" for searching
purposes. 32 Because data stored on backup tapes must be restored
onto a hard drive and reformatted before it can be searched, the
court found that the data requested from UBS was "inaccessi-
ble." 33 Having determined an undue burden existed under Rule
26(b)(1)(iii), the court searched for the proper remedy.
34
The court first looked to Rowe Entertainment, Inc. v. William
Morris Agency, Inc.,35 which held that federal courts have discre-
tion to "shift the costs" of electronic data production from the pro-
ducing party to the requesting party once an unduly costly or bur-
25. Id. at 312-13. Pre-Amendment Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) stated:
[t]he frequency or extent of use of the discovery methods set forth in subdivi-
sion (a) shall be limited by the court if it determines that ... (iii) the discovery
is unduly burdensome or expensive, taking into account the needs of the case,
the amount in controversy, limitations on the parties' resources, and the impor-
tance of the issues at stake in the litigation.
FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(1)(iii).
26. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 313-14.
27. Id. at 314.
28. Id. at 315-16.
29. See supra note 25.
30. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 316.
31. Id. "[Wlhether production of documents is unduly burdensome or expensive turns
primarily on whether it is kept in an accessible or inaccessible format." Id. at 318 (empha-
sis added).
32. Id. "[A] document is accessible if it is readily available in a usable format and rea-
sonably indexed." Id.
33. Id.
34. Id. at 320-21.
35. 205 F.R.D. 421 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
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densome request is made. 36 Unhappy with the cost-shifting stan-
dard found in Rowe, however, the court fashioned a new seven-
factor cost-shifting analysis, weighing the marginal utility of the
requested data against both the cost of production and the ability
of the responsive party to pay for production. 37 The seven factors
were similar to those used in Rowe, but also incorporated the cri-
teria listed in Rule 26(b)(1)(iii) for determining whether or not a
request is unduly burdensome or costly.38
This was not a complete victory for UBS, however, as the court
further held that UBS must first produce the requested data and
assume the cost of production up front. 39 The court felt that a
proper cost-shifting analysis could not be done until the court
knew the costs of production; therefore, UBS was ordered to re-
store the backup tapes at its own expense and encouraged to later
move for cost shifting.
40
While this holding provided responding parties with a procedure
for seeking reimbursement after unnecessary discovery costs are
incurred, it did not prevent requesting parties from harassing op-
posing parties with intrusive requests. Not only was the respond-
ing party required to prove an "undue burden," it also had to pay
the costs of production up front. After Zubulake I, parties were
still free to submit unreasonable discovery requests, putting the
burden on the responding party to shift costs.
36. Rowe, 205 F.R.D. at 432-33.
37. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 321-23.
38. Id. at 323. The court stated:
Set forth below is a new seven-factor test based on the modifications to Rowe
discussed in the preceding sections. (1) The extent to which the request is spe-
cifically tailored to discover relevant information; (2) The availability of such
information from other sources; (3) The total cost of production, compared to
the amount in controversy; (4) The total cost of production, compared to the re-
sources available to each party; (5) The relative ability of each party to control
costs and its incentive to do so; (6) The importance of the issues at stake in the
litigation; and (7) The relative benefits to the parties of obtaining the informa-
tion.
Id. at 322.
39. Id. at 324. "Requiring the responding party to restore and produce responsive
documents from a small sample will inform the cost-shifting analysis laid out above." Id.
See id. at 322.
40. Id. "When based on an actual sample, the marginal utility test will not be an exer-
cise of speculation - there will be tangible evidence of what the backup tapes have to offer
... [and] the time and cost required to restore the backup tapes." Id. at 325.
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B. The Preservation of Electronic Data
Document preservation was also a concern of the Committee
while drafting the Amendments. 41 As electronically stored infor-
mation is dynamic, rather than static, it can be deleted, overwrit-
ten or modified, intentionally or negligently, by action or inac-
tion.42 The ease with which electronic data can be modified or de-
leted is of obvious concern to litigants. Not only do businesses use
computers to store important documents, a recent survey on elec-
tronic communications found that 70 percent of companies use e-
mail for negotiating contracts and agreements. 43 It is extremely
important that these electronic documents are not only saved, but
preserved in their original manner, as subsequent litigation may
necessitate their production.
The willful or negligent loss of relevant evidence during trial or
in anticipation of litigation is known as spoliation, and carries
with it severe penal and civil penalties. 44 In Zubulake VI, for ex-
ample, the jury found that UBS willfully deleted the e-mails that
the court determined were relevant in Zubulake J.45 The jury sub-
sequently awarded Zubulake $29.3 million in damages ($9.1 mil-
lion in compensatory damages and $20.2 million in punitive dam-
41. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-18.
42. DAVID G. RIES, E-DISCOVERY- THE BAsIcs 5 (2006).
43. AIIM and Kahn Consulting, Struggle Continues Between How Organizations Use
Electronic Communications Technology and How They Are Managed, Mar. 2, 2005,
http://www.aiim.orglarticle-pr.asp?ID=29428.
44. Spoliation is "the destruction or significant alteration of evidence, or the failure to
preserve property for another's use as evidence in pending or reasonably foreseeable litiga-
tion." Zubulake IV, 220 F.R.D. 212, 216 (S.D.N.Y. 2003). Zubulake V gave litigants the
appropriate standard:
First, counsel must issue a "litigation hold" at the outset of litigation or when-
ever litigation is reasonably anticipated. The litigation hold should be periodi-
cally re-issued so that new employees are aware of it, and so that it is fresh in
the minds of all employees. Second, counsel should communicate directly with
the "key players" in the litigation, i.e., the people identified in a party's initial
disclosure and any subsequent supplementation thereto. Because these "key
players" are the "employees likely to have relevant information," it is particu-
larly important that the preservation duty be communicated early to them. As
with the litigation hold, the key players should be periodically reminded that
the preservation duty is still in place. Finally counsel should instruct all em-
ployees to produce electronic copies of their relevant active files. Counsel must
also make sure that all backup media which the party is required to retain is
identified and stored in a safe place.
Zubulake V, 229 F.R.D. 422, 433-34 (S.D.N.Y. 2004). A "litigation hold" is what courts
commonly refer to as the suspension of a routine document retention/destruction policy at
the outset of litigation. Zubulake !V, 220 F.R.D. at 218.
45. Zubulake VI, 382 F. Supp. 2d 536, 547 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
ages). 46 This award, however, pales in comparison to the one
given in Coleman Holdings, Inc. v. Morgan Stanley & Co., Inc.
47
In Coleman, the jury awarded Coleman Holdings $1.45 billion in
damages ($604 million in compensatory damages and $850 million
in punitive damages) after finding that Morgan Stanley failed to
search approximately 1400 backup tapes for e-mails, then filed a
false certificate with the court claiming that the search had been
made. 48
Punitive damages are not the only potential repercussion, as in-
tentional spoliation may lead to jail time as well. Following the
Enron scandal, Arthur Anderson was convicted of obstruction of
justice due to its electronic document retention policy, which the
government claimed encouraged the destruction of relevant elec-
tronic data. 49 Members of the board of directors were sentenced to
serve time in prison, and their convictions were subsequently af-
firmed by the Fifth Circuit. 50
The federal government has made it clear, through both legisla-
tive and judicial action, that the intentional deletion or manipula-
tion of electronic evidence is strictly prohibited. 51 Circuits are
split, however, as to whether or not negligent spoliation is sanc-
tionable. 52 Negligent, or "good faith," spoliation is the unknowing
deletion of relevant evidence by a computer program during or in
anticipation of litigation.
5 3
Because it is fiscally and administratively impossible for large
businesses to preserve every piece of electronic data for an infinite
period of time, large businesses have programs that recycle stale
data after a certain period. 54 These programs operate automati-
cally, deleting antiquated files when newer files require storage. 55
46. Zubulake VI, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 547.
47. No. 502003CA00504XXOCAI, 2005 WL 679071 (Fla. Cir. Ct. Mar. 1, 2005).
48. Coleman, 2005 WL 679071, at *7-8.
49. United States v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 374 F.3d 281 (5th Cir. 2004), rev'd 544 U.S.
696 (2005).
50. Arthur Anderson, 374 F.3d at 284. The convictions were later overturned by the
United States Supreme Court on procedural grounds. See United States v. Arthur Ander-
son, LLP, 544 U.S. 696 (2005).
51. Rule 37(b) permits the court to impose sanctions on parties who fail to fully disclose
relevant evidence that is requested of them. See generally FED. R. CIV. P. 37(b) (2005).
52. See Residential Funding Corp. v. DeGeorge Fin. Corp., 306 F.3d 99, 101 (2nd Cir.
2002) (sanctions "may be imposed where a party has breached a discovery obligation not
only through bad faith or gross negligence, but also through ordinary negligence'); Steven-
son v. Union Pac. R.R. Co., 354 F.3d 739, 746 (8th Cir. 2004) ("under ... federal law there
must be a finding of intentional destruction indicating a desire to suppress the truth").
53. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-83.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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Problems arise when electronic data, deleted during or in antici-
pation of litigation, comes into issue later on during trial.
56
Currently, federal courts are unable to give litigants a consis-
tent and reliable solution to this problem; some circuit courts pe-
nalize parties for good faith spoliation, while others decline to do
So.57 Businesses, therefore, do not know what information needs
to be preserved once litigation is reasonably anticipated. Ideally,
companies would prefer to allow their data recycling programs to
continue unfettered, as it can be difficult and costly for entities to
reprogram their systems to allow for the preservation of all poten-
tially relevant electronic data.58 However, with millions, if not
billions, of dollars in sanctions at stake, companies need a clearer
annunciation of the court's discretion in imposing sanctions for
good faith spoliation.
C. Form of Production
The final concern of the Committee in drafting the Amendments
was the form in which electronic data is produced during discov-
ery. 59 Because electronic data may be incomplete or incomprehen-
sible when it is separated from the system on which it was cre-
ated, the form in which electronic data is produced is an important
issue for litigants.
All electronic documents inherently contain "metadata," or
"data about data.'' 60 Metadata is information about a document
that is contained within the system and does not appear on a pa-
per printout. 61 Metadata may include facts ranging from when
and by whom a file was last edited, to the calculations used to de-
rive the statistics found on a spreadsheet. 62 Metadata is an im-
portant consideration for both the producing and requesting party
when deciding on the form of production because there may be
privileged and/or relevant information within a file's metadata.
56. Both counsel and client alike have an absolute duty to "issue a litigation hold at the
outset of litigation or whenever litigation is reasonably anticipated." Zubulake V, 229
F.R.D. 422, 433 (S.D.N.Y. 2004).
57. See supra note 52.
58. "[A]mended Rule [37(f)] recognizes that suspending or interrupting [computer recy-
cling programs] ... can be prohibitively expensive and burdensome." REPORT, supra note
2, at C-83.
59. Id. at C-18.




In Williams v. Sprint/United Management Co., 63 the court set
forth what is now the current standard for the production of
metadata. 64 There, plaintiff Shirley Williams requested the pro-
duction of certain spreadsheets during the course of discovery, to
which defendant Sprint/United Management, Co. ("Sprint") re-
sponded by handing over paper printouts of said spreadsheets. 65
Williams subsequently demanded the production of the spread-
sheets in an electronic format so that she may have access to the
calculations giving rise to the statistics on the printout. 66 Sprint
refused to provide an electronic version.
67
In deciding the issue, the court focused on the meaning of the
term "document," as found within Rule 34,68 and held that elec-
tronic documents include all information "ordinarily viewable by
the user" when the file is in electronic format.69 Because the
spreadsheet calculations were ordinarily viewable by the computer
system's user, the court ordered Sprint to produce the spread-
sheets in an electronic format, such as a floppy disk. 70
While it is currently clear that all metadata ordinarily viewable
by the user of the electronic file is subject to the same standards of
discovery as the electronic file itself, many questions surrounding
metadata still exist. For example, may a party request a specific
form of production? Moreover, what is a responsive party's duty to
answer such a request?
III. THE 2006 AMENDMENTS TO THE FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE
With these three overarching concerns in mind, 71 the Commit-
tee drafted the 2006 Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. 72 While the changes are significant, the Amendments
63. 230 F.R.D. 640 (D. Kan. 2005).
64. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 650-52.
65. Id. at 642.
66. Id. at 643.
67. Id. at 644.
68. Pre-Amendment Rule 34 stated that "Any party may serve on any other party a
request... to produce and permit the party making the request, or someone acting on the
requestor's behalf, to inspect, copy, test, or sample any designated documents .... " FED. R.
CIV. P. 34(a) (2005).
69. Williams, 230 F.R.D. at 643-45.
70. Id. at 657.
71. The three main concerns of the Committee in drafting the Amendments were elec-
tronic data storage, preservation and production. See supra note 11.
72. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-IS.
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can be broken down into five major proposals. 73 Amended Rules
16(b), 26(a) and 26(f) ("Proposal One") encourage both the litigants
and the judge to address all e-discovery issues before discovery
begins. 74 Amended Rule 26(b)(2) ("Proposal Two") provides re-
sponding parties with a procedure for objecting to unreasonable
discovery requests. 75 Amended Rule 26(b)(5) ("Proposal Three")
confers upon responding parties the ability to assert privilege af-
ter the inadvertent production of privileged materials. 76 Amended
Rules 33(d), 34(a) and 34(b) ("Proposal Four") provide parties with
a procedure for requesting and objecting to the form of production
of electronic data. 77 Finally, amended Rule 37(f) ("Proposal Five")
makes it clear that the spoliation of electronic data in good faith is
not sanctionable under the Rules.
78
A. Proposal One: Early Planning
In order to encourage both the court and the litigants to attend
to e-discovery issues early in the litigation, amendments to Rules
16 and 26 invite the judge to address e-discovery in the scheduling
order, and encourage parties to discuss potential e-discovery prob-
lems at the pre-trial conference. 79 The goals of the Committee in
encouraging such discussions were to persuade the parties to
agree on the form of production, develop a plan for preserving
electronic data throughout the course of litigation and to properly
assert any privileges - all before discovery commences.
80
Rule 16(b)8 1 was amended to give the judge significant discre-
tion in handling e-discovery issues early in the litigation should he
or she believe that e-discovery will become problematic later on.
8 2
The judge is given the power to require the parties to develop a
73. There are actually six proposals; however, the sixth and final proposal merely pro-
vides for the subpoena of electronic data and does not necessitate analysis. See REPORT,
supra note 2, at C-91 to 108.
74. Id. at C-21 to 41.
75. Id. at C-42 to 53.
76. Id. at C-54 to 63.
77. Id. at C-64 to 82.
78. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-83 to 90.
79. Id. at C-23.
80. Id.
81. Amended Rule 16(b) additionally states "[tihe scheduling order also may include...
(5) provisions for disclosure or discovery of electronically stored information; (6) any agree-
ments the parties reach for asserting claims of privilege or of protection as trial-preparation
material after production...." Id. at C-26 to 27.
82. Id. at C-27 to 28. "The amendment to Rule 16(b) is designed to alert the court to
the possible need to address the handling of discovery of electronically stored information
early in the litigation if such discovery is expected to occur." Id.
discovery plan and to even set up a timetable for disclosure. 83 The
Committee believed that the court's involvement early in the liti-
gation will help prevent difficulties that may later arise.8 4 Rule
26(085 was amended to direct the parties to discuss any "issues
relating to [the] disclosure or discovery of electronically stored in-
formation" during the discovery planning conference.8 6  The
amendment specifically directs the parties to discuss and resolve
any issues relating to form of production, preservation of elec-
tronic evidence and assertion of privilege at the pre-trial confer-
ence. 8 7
B. Proposal Two: The Unreasonable Use of Discovery
The Committee's second proposal addresses the issuance of un-
reasonable discovery requests. 88 Amended Rule 26(b)(2)8 9 specifi-
cally allows a party to object to a discovery request on the basis
that it seeks electronic data that is "not reasonably accessible be-
cause of undue burden or cost." 90 After the responding party spe-
cifically identifies such inaccessible data, the opposing party may
move to compel production of the data with a showing of good
cause. 91 Further, the judge may compel production sua sponte if
83. Id. at C-26 to 27.
84. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-27.
85. Amended Rule 26(f) states that the parties' discovery plans must additionally in-
clude:
(3) any issues relating to disclosure or discovery of electronically stored infor-
mation, including the form or forms in which it should be produced; (4) any is-
sues relating to claims of privilege or of protection of trial-preparation material,
including-if the parties agree on a procedure to assert such claims after pro-
duction-whether to ask the court to include their agreement in an order ....
Id.
86. Id. at C-33.
87. Id. at C-24.
88. Id. at C-42.
89. Amended Rule 26(b)(2)(B) states:
A party need not provide discovery of electronically stored information from
sources that the party identifies as not reasonably accessible because of undue
burden or cost. On motion to compel discovery or for a protective order, the
party from whom discovery is sought must show that the information is not
reasonably accessible because of undue burden or cost. If that showing is
made, the court may nonetheless order discovery from such sources if the re-
questing party shows good cause, considering the limitations of Rule
26(b)(2)(C). The court may specify conditions for the discovery.
Id. at C-45 to 46.
90. Id. at C-42.
91. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-43.
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he or she feels good cause exists. 92 Under the amended Rule, good
cause exists if the burdens and costs to be incurred in production
can be justified under the circumstances of the case. 93  The
amended Rule also gives the judge discretion to specify conditions
of the forced production.
94
The purpose of the amendment was to allow parties to incur the
lowest costs possible while still producing responsive material.
95
The Committee felt that, in most cases, the discovery obtained
from the accessible sources will be sufficient to meet the needs of
the requesting party.96 However, if it is not, the Rule allows the
requesting party to compel production, subject to judicial supervi-
sion. 97 The amendment was specifically tailored to allow respond-
ing parties to avoid the exorbitant costs associated with the pro-
duction of data found on unsearchable mediums such as backup
tapes.98
C. Proposal Three: The Inadvertent Production of Privileged
Data
Proposal Three addresses the inadvertent production of privi-
leged materials and provides parties with a procedure to seek the
return of unintentionally disseminated documents. 99 Amended
Rule 26(b)(5) first requires a party asserting a claim of privilege to
give notice to the receiving party, stating the specific grounds
upon which the privilege is based.100 The receiving party is then
92. Id. "A finding that the responding party has shown that a source of information is
not reasonably accessible does not preclude discovery; the court may order discovery for
good cause." Id.
93. Id. at C-49. The Committee lists seven factors for determining good cause that are
very similar to the seven factors given by the court in Zubulake I for determining whether
or not to shift costs:
Appropriate considerations may include: (1) the specificity of the discovery re-
quest; (2) the quantity of information available from other and more easily ac-
cessed sources; (3) the failure to produce relevant information that seems likely
to have existed but is no longer available on more easily accessed sources; (4)
the likelihood of finding relevant responsive information that cannot be ob-
tained from other, more easily accessed sources; (5) predictions as to the impor-
tance and usefulness of the further information; (6) the importance of the is-
sues at stake in the litigation; and (7) the parties' resources.
Id.
94. Id. at C-44.
95. Id. at C-42.
96. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-42.
97. Id. at C-43.
98. Id. at C-42.
99. Id. at C-54.
100. Amended Rule 26(b)(5)(B) additionally states:
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given three options: to return, destroy or sequester the allegedly
privileged materials. 101 If the receiving party chooses sequestra-
tion, the judge will determine the legitimacy of the privilege and
rule accordingly. 1
02
The amendment does not address the substantive question of
whether or not a privilege has been waived or forfeited, but in-
stead provides parties with a procedure to allow the assertion of
privilege after mistaken production. 10 3 The Committee felt this
amendment was necessary in the context of electronic data due to
the massive amount of information that often must be dissemi-
nated. 10 4 Again, cost was an important consideration, as the
amendment was intended to reduce the costs and delays associ-
ated with reviewing electronic documents by allowing responding
parties the opportunity to assert any privileges after inadvertent
dissemination. 1
05
D. Proposal Four: Form of Production
Proposal Four specifically addresses the form in which elec-
tronically stored information must be presented when a party re-
sponds to an interrogatory or document request. 106 Amended Rule
33(d) 10 7 allows a party to respond to an electronic discovery re-
If information is produced in discovery that is subject to a claim of privilege or
of protection as trial-preparation material, the party making the claim may no-
tify any party that received the information of the claim and the basis for it.
After being notified, a party must promptly return, sequester, or destroy the
specified information and any copies it has and may not use or disclose the in-
formation until the claim is resolved. A receiving party may promptly present
the information to the court under seal for a determination of the claim. If the
receiving party disclosed the information before being notified, it must take
reasonable steps to retrieve it. The producing party must preserve the infor-
mation until the claim is resolved.
Id. at C-57 to 58.
101. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-54. "After receiving notification, the receiving party
must return, sequester, or destroy the information, and may not use or disclose it to third
parties until the claim is resolved." Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at C-58. "[Amended] Rule 26(b)(5)(B) does not address whether the privilege or
protection that is asserted after production was waived by production." Id.
104. Id. at C-54.
105. Id.
106. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-64.
107. Amended Rule 33(d) states:
Where the answer to an interrogatory may be derived or ascertained from the.
. electronically stored information [in its electronic form] ... and the burden of
deriving or ascertaining the answer is substantially the same for the party
serving the interrogatory as for the party served, it is a sufficient answer to
such interrogatory to specify the records from which the answer may be derived
or ascertained and to afford to the party serving the interrogatory reasonable
283
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quest by simply providing access to the system in which the elec-
tronic data exists. 108 Such an option is conditioned, however, on
the fact that retrieval of the requested data would be just as great
of a burden on the requesting party as on the responding party. 109
Proposal Four is similar in kind to Proposal Two, as both allow a
producing party to forego a burdensome routine when an effective
and easier method exists to disseminate responsive information.110
Amended Rule 33(d) accompanies amended Rule 34(b). 111
Amended Rule 34(b)' 12 permits the requesting party to designate
the form or forms in which it prefers electronic data to be pro-
duced." 3 For example, a requesting party may wish to have all
responsive e-mails produced in an electronic word processor for-
mat, or data compilations produced in an electronic spreadsheet
format.
If the producing party objects to the requested form, it must
provide a written response to the requesting party, stating the
grounds for objection and the form in which it intends to produce
the material. 114 If the requesting party is not satisfied by the form
suggested by the producing party, the parties must confer to re-
solve the dispute. 115 If such conference is fruitless, the proper re-
opportunity to examine, audit or inspect such records and to make copies, com-
pilations, abstracts, or summaries.
Id. at C-68 to 69.
108. Id. at C-69.
109. Id.
110. Id. See also id. at C-42.
111. Id. at C-64.
112. Amended Rule 34(b) states:
The request may specify the form or forms in which electronically stored infor-
mation is to be produced .... The party upon whom the request is served shall
serve a written response within 30 days after the service of the request ....
The response shall state, with respect to each item or category, that inspection
and related activities will be permitted as requested, unless the request is ob-
jected to, including an objection to the requested form or forms for producing
electronically stored information, stating the reasons for the objection .... If
objection is made to the requested form or forms for producing electronically
stored information-or if no form was specified in the request-the responding
party must state the form or forms it intends to use .... Unless the parties oth-
erwise agree, or the court otherwise orders . . . (ii) if a request does not specify
the form or forms for producing electronically stored information, a responding
party must produce the information in a form or forms in which it is ordinarily
maintained or in a form or forms that are reasonably usable; and (iii) a party
need not produce the same electronically stored information in more than one
form.
Id. at C-71-73.
113. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-71 to 73.
114. Id. at C-76.
115. Id.
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course for the requesting party is a motion to compel. 116 Amended
Rule 34(b) further states that if form of production is not specified
by a court order or party agreement, the responding party must
produce electronic data in a form in which the data is ordinarily
maintained or in a form which is reasonably usable. 117
E. Proposal Five: Spoliation
Proposal Five addresses a party's good faith failure to preserve
relevant and/or responsive electronic documentation. 118 Under
amended Rule 37(f), 119 a party will be insulated from spoliation
liability for failing to preserve relevant electronic data if the data
was lost during the routine, 120 good faith 121 maintenance of the
system that encased the data. 1
22
In drafting the amendment, the Committee recognized that
computer systems are commonly designed to replace old data with
new data in order to keep costs down and preserve storage
space.123 The purpose of this proposal was to therefore encourage
the use of this practice in order to keep costs low for businesses.
However, as the committee note that follows the amended Rule
states, good faith requires a party to suspend or modify a com-
puter system's routine operation in order to prevent the loss of
information subject to preservation obligations. 1
24
116. Id. at 77.
117. Id.
118. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-83.
119. Amended Rule 37(f) states "[a]bsent exceptional circumstances, a court may not
impose sanctions under [the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure] on a party for failing to pro-
vide electronically stored information lost as a result of the routine, good-faith operation of
an electronic information system." Id. at C-86.
120. '"The 'routine operation' of computer systems includes the alteration and overwrit-
ing of information, often without the operator's specific direction or awareness, a feature
with no direct counterpart in hard-copy documents." Id. at C-87.
121. 'The good faith requirement of Rule 37(f) means that a party is not permitted to
exploit the routine operation of an information system to thwart discovery obligations by
allowing that operation to continue in order to destroy specific stored information that it is
required to preserve." Id.
122. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-83.
123. Id. In its report, the Committee stated:
It can be difficult to interrupt the routine operation of computer systems to iso-
late and preserve discrete parts of the information they overwrite, delete, or
update on an ongoing basis, without creating problems for the larger system.
It is unrealistic to expect parties to stop such routine operation of their com-
puter systems as soon as they anticipate litigation.
Id.




The goals of the Committee in drafting the Amendments were to
increase the efficiency of e-discovery, "to reduce the costs of dis-
covery, to increase the uniformity of practice, to and encourage the
judiciary to participate more actively in case management."'125
Only time will tell if these goals will be achieved by the Amend-
ments; however, numerous scholars, bar associations, lawyers and
judges have already commented on the Amendments and pre-
dicted their effectiveness. 
126
While Proposals One, Three and Four were warmly welcomed
by the public and unanimously approved by the Committee, Pro-
posals Two and Five have been highly criticized and failed to get
unanimous Committee support. 127 Critics were wary of the fact
that Proposals Two and Five did not have clear boundaries and
will require judicial interpretation. 128 However, these critics may
be jumping the gun, as it is the job of the Legislature to pass laws,
and the job of the Judiciary to interpret and apply those laws. The
public must have trust in the Judiciary to properly interpret and
apply the Amendments, as the Committee has made its intent
quite clear within the parameters of both the amended Rules
themselves and the committee notes that further explain the
Rules.
With some critics claiming that Proposal Two will create "satel-
lite litigation,"'129 and others insisting it will cause "legal Cherno-
byl,"'130 Proposal Two has by far received the most criticism. The
fear is that amended Rule 26(b)(2) creates more problems than it
solves because additional discovery may be necessary for the court
to determine whether or not information tagged as "not reasona-
bly accessible" is, in fact, not reasonably accessible. 131
While it is true that amended Rule 26(b)(2) requires the court to
make a preliminary finding as to the actual accessibility of elec-
125. Id. at C-21.
126. Id. at C-18. See infra notes 130 and 142.
127. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-21.
128. "At the very least, it appears that the contours of proposed [Rule] 37(f) will need to
be determined judicially." Medved, supra note 7, at 5. "[T]he interplay of amended Rules
26(b)(2) and 37(f) will enable corporate entities, in the normal course of business, to shift e-
information from being reasonably accessible to inaccessible." Id. at 4.
129. Id.
130. Ephraim Schwartz, Document Management Systems Go to Court: New Federal
Rules for 2006 Could Come Down Hard on IT, INFOWORLD (December 27, 2005), available
at www.infoworld.com/article/05/12/27/01OPreality-l.html.
131. Medved, supra note 7, at 4. See REPORT, supra note 2, at C-49.
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tronic evidence tagged as "not reasonably accessible," the inquiry
is similar to the requisite cost-shifting analysis created by Zubu-
lake . In fact, amended Rule 26(b)(2) appears to codify Zubulake
I, including seven factors to determine "good cause" which are
similar to those used in Zubulake I for determining "cost-
shifting." 132 The only change that accompanies Proposal Two is
the fact that responding parties are no longer required to incur
unreasonable costs up front, so long as they can state/make a
prima facie case showing that the evidence sought is "not reasona-
bly accessible."'
133
Proposal Two does not create additional, or "satellite," litigation,
but simply moves forward the litigation regarding the production
of inaccessible data so the producing party does not have to "front"
the costs of production. 134 Under amended Rule 26(b)(2), the pro-
ducing party may mark data as "inaccessible" at the outset of the
litigation. 135 The requesting party must then either show "good
cause" to compel production, or seek the information from other
sources. 136 The "good cause" analysis is intended to replace the
seven-factor "cost-shifting" analysis founded in Zubulake I, with
an added emphasis on the availability of the requested informa-
tion from more accessible sources. 1
37
Proposal Two does not create additional litigation by introduc-
ing a "good cause" analysis, as the current method requires a simi-
lar "cost-shifting" analysis. 138 Further, the Committee's goals of
reducing the costs of discovery and making e-discovery more effi-
cient are advanced by the proposal. Litigants can no longer har-
ass responsive parties with unreasonable discovery requests, and
responsive parties no longer have to front the costs of unreason-
able discovery requests.
Proposal Five has also received misplaced criticism. 139 It has
been accused of creating an ineffective rule,140 lending additional
132. See supra note 38 for the Zubulake cost-shifting test and supra note 93 for the
Committee's "good cause" test.
133. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-49. See Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. 309, 324 (2003).
134. See REPORT, supra note 2, at C-49.
135. Id. at C-46.
136. Id. at C-49.
137. Id. at C-44. "But in an improvement over the present practice, in which parties
simply do not produce inaccessible electronically stored information, the amendment re-
quires the responding party to identify the sources of information that were not searched,
clarifying and focusing the issue for the requesting party." Id.
138. Zubulake I, 217 F.R.D. at 324.
139. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-84.
140. Medved, supra note 7, at 5. Amended Rule 37(f) "does not prevent a court from
exercising its inherent power to sanction a party." Id. (citing Glover v. BIC Corp., 6 F.3d
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opportunities for discovery disputes 141 and even violating the
Rules Enabling Act. 1
42
Critics first accuse Proposal Five of being ineffective, claiming
that while judges will no longer have authority under the Rules to
sanction good faith spoliation, judges will still have the inherent
power to sanction such conduct. 143 Though judges have the inher-
ent power to sanction parties, judges do not typically sanction
conduct done in good faith, as sanctions are intended to punish
parties for conduct done in bad faith. 144 Amended Rule 37(f) is
clear that it is only meant to insulate parties from liability for
"good faith" spoliation. 145 Such criticism is therefore meritless.
Next, Proposal Five has been criticized for lending an opportu-
nity for additional discovery disputes, as parties will now be en-
couraged to litigate whether or not the spoliation in question oc-
curred in "good faith."'146  This argument is also without
merit/reason. Though the court will now be forced to hear argu-
ment on whether or not the spoliation in issue occurred in good
faith, the court need not hear argument on whether or not good
faith spoliation is actually sanctionable. 147 Amended Rule 37(f)
settles the law in this often-disputed area by making it clear that
the negligent deletion of relevant electronic data during or in an-
ticipation of litigation is a non-sanctionable offense.1
48
Finally, Proposal Five has been accused of violating the Rules
Enabling Act ("REA"), as it allegedly creates an affirmative duty
1318, 1329 (9th Cir. 1993) ("A federal trial court has the inherent discretionary power to
make appropriate evidentiary rulings in response to the destruction or spoliation of rele-
vant evidence.")).
141. Medved, supra note 7, at 5. Amended Rule 37(f) "appears to provide fertile grounds
for additional discovery disputes." Id.
142. Nathan D. Larsen, Evaluating the Proposed Changes to Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure 37: Spoliation, Routine Operation and the Rules Enabling Act, 4 NW. J. OF TECH. &
PROP. 212, 22 (2006). The Rules Enabling Act is promulgated under 28 U.S.C. § 2072
(1982).
143. See Glover, 6 F.3d at 1329.
144. Chambers v. NASCO, Inc., 501 U.S. 32, 50-51 (1991). "A court must, of course,
exercise caution in invoking its inherent power [to sanction], and it must comply with the
mandates of due process... in determining that the requisite bad faith exists." Chambers,
501 U.S. at 50-51 (emphasis added).
145. "Absent exceptional circumstances, a court may not impose sanctions under these
rules on a party for failing to provide such electronically stored information lost as a result
of routine, good-faith operation of an electronic information system." REPORT, supra note 2,
at C-89-90 (emphasis added).
146. Medved, supra note 7, at 5.
147. See REPORT, supra note 2, at C-83.
148. Id.
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for companies to retain data. 149 The REA states that no federal
rule "shall abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right," yet
some commentators are cautious that once the judiciary defines
"routine operation," companies will have an affirmative, substan-
tive duty to preserve data that is not deleted in routine operation
of their data recycling programs. 1
50
These skeptics are reading into the Proposal a positive duty that
does not exist. The plain language of amended Rule 37(f) merely
states that the court may not sanction good-faith spoliation that
occurred during the routine operation of a data-recycling pro-
gram. 151 The Proposal does not require companies to preserve
data, but merely eliminates the power of the court to sanction spo-
liation that occurred during routine operation. To say that Pro-
posal Five creates an affirmative duty is to say that every Rule
creates a positive duty.
It would be akin to claiming that Rule 13(a) 152 bestows upon de-
fendants a positive duty to assert all counterclaims which arise
out of the same transaction or occurrence that are the subject of
the plaintiffs complaint. Surely, it is beneficial for the defendant
to assert all compulsory counterclaims in his response, as failure
to do so constitutes a waiver of the right to bring them. 153 But the
defendant does not have a positive duty to do so. He may simply
choose not to bring them and forever waive his right.
Similarly, amended Rule 37(f) does not require companies to
preserve all data that is not deleted during the routine operation
of their recycling program. 154 The amended Rule makes it benefi-
cial for a company to preserve electronic data that is not routinely
deleted by allowing such spoliation to be sanctioned; however, it
does not bestow upon companies a duty to preserve. Even if "rou-
tine operation" is given a definite interpretation, companies will
not have a duty to preserve data that is not deleted in the routine
operation of their data recycling programs; such preservation
would simply be beneficial.
149. Larsen, supra note 142. "Any attempt to define the affirmative duties of companies
to retain electronic information should be left to legislatures or to common law rulemaking.
Essentially, commentators should not ask for what they cannot get in a Federal Rule: sub-
stantive rule making." Id.
150. Id. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (1988).
151. REPORT, supra note 2, at C-86.
152. Rule 13(a) states "[a] pleading shall state as a counterclaim any claim which ...
arises out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the opposing party's
claim." FED. R. CIv. P. 13(a) (emphasis added).
153. Id.
154. See REPORT, supra note 2, at C-86.
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While Proposals Two and Five have received much debate, both
are positive solutions to growing problems. Settlements based on
the costs of discovery, instead of the merits of the suit, go against
the very grain of our judicial system. And with e-discovery leav-
ing companies with costs ranging between six and seven figures,
one does not need a law degree to understand that the current
system provides plaintiffs with an opportunity to leverage hefty
settlements with intrusive discovery requests. As Proposal Two
will cut down on the cost of production, and Proposal Five will cut
down on the cost of preservation, without any major side effects,
both should be looked at as a huge success.
While Proposals Two and Five are making the headlines, Pro-
posals One, Three, and Four also deserve an analytical eye. Pro-
posal One has been "consistently applauded" by commentators,
155
and deservedly so. The Proposal squarely addresses the Commit-
tee's goal of improving the efficiency of e-discovery by requiring
parties to put in writing their plans for electronic data production,
preservation and privilege before discovery even begins. 156 The
Proposal also gives judges the discretion to step in if he or she
feels that the parties have not made the appropriate accommoda-
tions. 157 Proposal One will not only solve many problems before
they arise by encouraging open communication, the Proposal will
cut down on the costs and burdens associated with e-discovery by
forcing parties to plan and prepare for any foreseeable e-discovery
issues.
Proposal Three should also be viewed in a positive light, as it
serves as an equitable solution to a growing problem. Surely, a
party should not be able to benefit from the inevitable mistake of
another. 15 Therefore, it only makes sense to allow litigants a
chance to assert privilege after the inadvertent disclosure of privi-
leged documentation. 159 The Proposal is further successful as it
allows parties to cut down on burdensome and time-consuming
document review by reducing the marginal benefit associated with
thorough document appraisal. 1
60
Proposal Four should also be considered a great achievement.
By not only allowing parties to request the form of production, but
155. Id. at C-23.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. The Committee refers to inadvertent disclosures of privileged documentation as
"inevitable blunders." Id. at C-54.
159. See id. at C-54 to 55.
160. See REPORT, supra note 2, at C-55 to 56.
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by providing a default form of electronic data production, Proposal
Four should dramatically cut down on the amount of litigation
associated with electronic data production.1 6 1 Further, when Pro-
posal Four is combined with the provision of Proposal One that
allows parties to agree on form before discovery begins, it appears
that the Committee may have successfully put to rest all litigation
currently associated with form of production.
V. CONCLUSION
Whether a private practitioner or a mega-firm corporate lawyer,
every attorney must become familiar with the 2006 Amendments
to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. E-mail is changing the
way trials are won and lost, and those in the legal profession must
be aware of these changes in order to avoid antiquation. An e-
mail may be the center of any legal dispute. It can show a dece-
dent's intent to modify his will, constitute the exclusive evidence
of an alleged contract, or accept an offer to merge two, billion-
dollar corporations. The 2006 Amendments provide litigants with
codified procedures for preserving, requesting and producing such
electronic evidence. As litigants communicate and store informa-
tion by electronic means, both counsel and client alike must have
a thorough understanding of these procedures.
Salvatore Joseph Bauccio
161. See id. at C-64 to 68.
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